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Children’s science learning: a core skills approach  
 
Abstract 
 
Background: Research has identified the core skills that predict success during primary 
school in reading and arithmetic, and this knowledge increasingly informs teaching. 
However, there has been no comparable work which pinpoints the core skills that underlie 
success in science.  
Aims and Method: The present paper attempts to redress this by examining candidate skills 
and considering what is known about the way in which they emerge, how they relate to each 
other and to other abilities, how they change with age, and how their growth may vary 
between topic areas.  
Results: There is growing evidence that early-emerging tacit awareness of causal 
associations is initially separated from language-based causal knowledge, which is acquired 
in part from everyday conversation and shows inaccuracies not evident in tacit knowledge. 
Mapping of descriptive and explanatory language onto causal awareness appears therefore 
to be a key development, which promotes unified conceptual and procedural understanding.  
Conclusions: This account suggests that the core components of initial science learning are 
1) accurate observation, 2) the ability to extract and reason explicitly about causal 
connections, and 3) knowledge of mechanisms that explain these connections. 
Observational ability is educationally inaccessible until integrated with verbal description and 
explanation, for instance via collaborative group work tasks that require explicit reasoning 
with respect to joint observations. Descriptive and explanatory ability are further promoted by 
managed exposure to scientific vocabulary and use of scientific language. Scientific 
reasoning and hypothesis testing are later acquisitions which depend on this integration of 
systems and improved executive control. 
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Background and aims 
 
In recent years, research has made substantial progress in uncovering the core cognitive 
skills that predict success in primary reading and mathematics, using a strategy of 
systematic analysis of influences on individual variations in outcome. Specifically, evidence 
demonstrates support for the ‘simple view of reading’, which suggests that acquisition of 
reading skills rests on two distinct processes, learning of orthographic/sound relationships, 
and growth of the ability to extract meaning from assemblages of text (Hulme & Snowling, 
2009). In mathematics, grasp of counting procedures and principles, recognition and use of 
symbols, translation between verbal and symbolic formats, and knowledge of number facts 
and calculation strategies have been identified as relatively independent key skills with an 
underpinning influence from working memory (Soltesz, Szucs & Szucs, 2010). Crucially, 
knowledge of core skills in both these subjects has begun to lead to changes in teaching 
practices with benefits for children’s learning (Dowker & Sigley, 2010; Wyse & Goswami, 
2008).  
 
In contrast, there has yet to be any similar attempt to identify the underlying core 
competences necessary to engage with science. This absence is striking given the 
importance attached to science alongside literacy and numeracy by national governments, 
and its consequent inclusion in global measures of educational achievement such as the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Vitally, scientific ability does not 
just concern disciplinary knowledge about how we and the world around us function, but also 
– like reading and mathematics – a crucial skill set, which includes the capacity to collect 
and assess evidence about causal relationships in unbiased fashion, and to draw from it 
appropriate and explicit conclusions that can be shared and debated with others. These 
quintessentially cognitive abilities are as fundamental to participation in modern societies as 
being able to read, write and calculate. 
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The current paper aims to consider how this gap in understanding might be filled, by 
examining existing evidence with regard to two essential questions: 
 
1. What core skills might predict scientific understanding amongst primary school children? 
2. How do these core skills relate to each other and to more general cognitive abilities? 
 
 
What skills might underpin the growth of children’s scientific understanding? 
 
Construction of a skills-based account of science learning rests on how we define such 
learning.  In terms of outcome, there is widespread consensus that scientific reasoning and 
scientific knowledge are the two main branches of scientific understanding since they 
underpin key aspects of professional science and are central to its focus on uncovering 
causation (Bybee, 1997; Koerber, Mayer, Osterhaus & Schwippert, 2015; Wellington, 1988). 
Scientific reasoning (or ‘scientific thinking’) refers to the processes of scientific enquiry that 
make it possible to isolate causal influences, particularly the key components of 
experimental procedure: generation of hypotheses, controlled testing, and use of evidence to 
evaluate hypotheses (Klahr, 2000, 2005; Zimmerman, 2007). Understanding of what is 
involved in each of these components has been argued to rest further on sub-skills such as 
the identification of variables and use of controlled tests that manipulate these one at a time, 
which make it possible to isolate causal influences. Scientific knowledge concerns the 
concepts and theories that capture and explain the mechanisms by which causal influences 
produce outcomes (Piaget, 1972) and the application of these to specific contexts. These 
two strands of ability are typically seen as the principal targets of science learning, and have 
long been treated as constituting a distinct and separable procedural vs conceptual 
dichotomy, with the former resting on domain-general skills (i.e., applicable in any context), 
and the latter on domain-specific knowledge (see e.g., Fugelsang & Mareschal, 2014). 
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However, as is outlined below, current evidence on the emergence and interrelationship 
between these two dimensions presents in fact a somewhat muddy picture.  
 
Evidence on scientific reasoning 
On the face of it, studies of children’s procedural or investigative abilities indicate a 
straightforward willingness from 4 years to manipulate factors to assess their impact on 
outcome (i.e., in some sense to hypothesise and test their influence), especially when 
presented with contradictory or unclear prior evidence. For instance, Bonawitz, Ferranti, 
Saxe, Gopnik, Meltzoff, Woodward and Schulz (2010) found that from 47 months on – but 
not younger – the majority of children spontaneously intervened to manipulate a previously 
observed simple cause-effect relationship in which the movement of a block activated the 
operation of a toy plane. Drawing on the ‘blicket detector’ task devised by Gopnik, Sobel, 
Schulz and Glymour (2001), Legare (2012) presented preschool children with a series of 
trials in which only objects with certain features (‘blickets’) activated the light on a box when 
placed in contact with it. When these were followed by a further trial in which a ‘blicket’ failed 
to trigger the light, children produced causal function explanations when asked what had 
happened, and to the extent that they did so, engaged in greater amounts of exploratory 
manipulation of the objects, suggesting they were attempting to hypothesise and test 
expected effects.  
 
Similarly, Cook, Goodman and Schulz (2011) examined children’s activity when presented 
with ambiguous causal information. Preschool children were shown that 2 out of 4 beads 
made a toy play music when the beads were placed one at a time on top of it. They were 
then shown two pairs of further beads, one of which could be pulled apart into two individual 
beads, while the other pair was glued together. Both bead pairs activated the toy. The 
evidence about the bead pairs was ambiguous since it failed to distinguish which bead 
worked (or whether both did), and the baseline information suggested there was no 
inevitable relationship. Children were then allowed a brief period of free play with the bead 
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pairs, and assessed on how far they engaged in informative exploration by testing the effects 
of the separable beads individually. When given unambiguous evidence on comparison 
trials, children played indiscriminately, but when faced with ambiguous evidence, they both 
selected and designed informative interventions.   
 
Given the apparent contingency of all these investigative behaviours on prior observation, 
they evidently depend on the ability to track and assess evidence, and to isolate factors that 
covary with outcomes. This ability appears to emerge even earlier. Using habituation 
paradigms, Leslie and Keeble (1987) found evidence that infants infer causal relationships 
from contact events in which one object collides with a second, apparently making it move, 
and carry expectations about these relationships forward into subsequent experience. 
Gopnik et al. (2001) found that children as young as 2 years were able to reliably predict 
which objects would activate their ‘blicket detector’ on the basis of prior observation of the 
features associated with it being triggered. Schulz, Gopnik and Glymour (2007) found that 3 
to 5 year olds were able to selectively identify diagrams which captured previously witnessed 
relationships between the movements of toy gears.  
 
However, despite the consistent picture presented by these and related studies, the nature 
of the abilities that have been demonstrated – and their relation to scientific reasoning – is in 
fact unclear. There are three areas of doubt. First of all, the data obtained often fit poorly 
with the interpretation placed upon them. In Legare (2012), for instance, responses 
categorized as causal function explanations were more common among 2 to 4 year olds (c. 
50% of responses) than 5 to 6 year olds (c. 30%), with the 5 year olds producing more non-
causal explanations. Both points are developmentally surprising yet ignored by the author. 
Moreover, examples of causal function explanations included “it’s broken” and simple 
descriptions of differences in object features, which carry little obvious causal intension or 
articulation of process, as the label ‘explanation’ ostensibly requires. More generally, both 
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here and elsewhere, the focus on modal patterns of response glosses over individual 
variations which might inform a richer story about the growth of abilities. 
 
Second, as a result of concerns that existing concepts may bias the assessment of evidence 
(Fugelsang, Stein, Green & Dunbar, 2004), the paradigms involved in a great many of these 
studies (e.g., the ‘blicket detector’) are deliberately isolated from genuine scientific content, 
so as to capture ‘pure’, de-contextualised scientific thinking (cf. the procedural-conceptual 
dichotomy). The few studies that have utilised real contexts indicate that these do indeed 
influence performance in unpredictable fashion. For example, Ape, Flottmann and Leuchter 
(2015) used a simple multiple-choice paradigm with visual materials to assess 6 year olds’ 
knowledge of effects in four areas (slopes, friction, object flotation and plant growth), along 
with their ability to identify a control of variables strategy (CVS) as an appropriate means of 
investigating effects. CVS responses varied across area from 10% to 42% of instances, but 
with no clear relationship to knowledge of effects. For instance, although the two least 
understood areas (slopes and object flotation) produced more CVS responses, which might 
suggest prior understanding can bias approaches to testing (cf. Penner & Klahr, 1996), the 
rate for slopes was twice that for flotation, which is harder to explain. Similarly, the two best 
understood areas (friction and plant growth) produced different response patterns: holding 
the focal variable constant (either providing water or sunlight) was dominant for plant growth, 
indicating a possible bias towards preserving an expected outcome, whereas no consistent 
choice of strategy was the dominant outcome for friction. Confusing the picture further, other 
studies have found that 4 year olds can identify conclusive experiments so long as the 
outcome is in line with their conceptual understanding, indicating knowledge may be a 
prerequisite, not a distractor (Piekny & Maehler, 2013; see also Croker & Buchanan, 2011; 
Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer & Nett, 2005). 
 
These apparently unsystematic variations arguably justify blicket-style approaches to testing 
children’s procedural skills, though they also undermine any claim that these skills operate in 
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domain-general fashion as that strategy presupposes (cf. Klahr, 2000; and see also 
Schauble, Klopfer & Raghavan, 1991, who argue that both straightforward domain generality 
and domain specificity are over-simplifications). The net result is that evidence from studies 
of this type tell us little that is certain about how children’s abilities might relate to their 
capacity to investigate genuine phenomena – the ultimate point of developing such skills – or 
how that capacity improves with age. It is this which we most obviously need to understand 
from an educational perspective, and the apparently unpredictable effects identified by Ape 
et al. (2015) merely serve to underline why it is important that we do so. 
 
The third area of doubt is that although the existence of a ‘proto-investigative’ propensity 
from early childhood appears undeniable, it plainly does not equate to genuine 
experimentation. Studies that have examined explicit hypothesis generation, testing and 
evaluation in the context of real phenomena have found that selection of test variables, 
controlled manipulation, and unbiased inference from observation are poor, regardless of 
topic area, and remain so into secondary school, albeit with some degree of individual 
variation. Howe, Tolmie and Sofroniou (1999), for example, examined the ability of 9 to 14 
year olds to use physical materials to conduct systematic investigations of the effects of 
factors in four topic areas in order to establish whether or not their beliefs regarding these 
effects were correct. Very few children appreciated the need to manipulate variables in a 
controlled manner, and having introduced extraneous factors, most then struggled with 
predicting outcomes, observing effects and coordinating data into appropriate conclusions. 
Many also explicitly claimed that when the effect of a factor was ‘known’ (from their point of 
view), there was no point in testing it, and they therefore failed even to grasp the basic 
purpose of experimentation. Similar outcomes were reported by Schauble (1990), who found 
that invalid heuristics that preserved favoured theories persisted among 10 to 12 year olds 
even after eight weeks’ work on problems. 
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Potentially explaining some of the difficulties, Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease and Wirkala (2008) 
found that 12 to 13 year olds exhibited high levels of inconsistency in the extent to which 
they implicated each of a set of established causal variables in predictions of multivariable 
outcomes, sometimes attributing causal influence to a given variable and sometimes not. 
This suggests that they have difficulty maintaining any stable focus on individual factors, 
perhaps because of the cognitive load involved, or even that they fail to appreciate that 
variables operate in consistent fashion. In line with the former, other research has reported 
that the number of variables to be controlled or manipulated impacts on performance, as 
does whether the task is to actually design experiments, as opposed to simply assessing the 
characteristics of presented designs (see e.g., Howe, 2014a, for a summary). In addition, 
though, Schauble et al. (1991) found that 10 to 12 year olds tended to favour an engineering 
model of experimentation, characterized by the goal of manipulating variables to produce a 
desired outcome, only shifting to a scientific model when they were supported to do so. 
 
Piekny and Maehler (2013) also report that key aspects of scientific reasoning emerge at 
different times: evaluating perfectly covarying data develops early in primary school; 
understanding the difference between an experiment and obtaining a desired outcome 
emerges next; and the ability to generate hypotheses develops last. Moreover, the exact 
timing of this sequence may be unstable. Research by Shayer and Ginsburg (2009), 
comparing data on secondary school students’ performance on control of variable tasks in 
1976 and 2006/7, found a decline over that period of half a standard deviation or more. This 
may indicate the existence of unknown cultural influences which have perpetuated and 
increased biases towards demonstrating that one’s existing beliefs are correct or obtaining a 
desired outcome, although other explanations may be possible (e.g. reduced familiarity with 
the questioning style or with the phenomena to be investigated due to changes in the 
curriculum).  
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At best then, all we are really able to conclude is that refined investigative understanding 
appears to be a relatively late development, dependent on earlier skills. It remains an open 
question as to whether early investigative propensities are among these, and if so, in what 
way they influence later ability. Efforts to theorise what the relationship might be are made 
harder by the loose definition in developmental research of what such propensities actually 
comprise and the accompanying tendency to focus on general patterns of performance 
rather than its precise details. 
 
Evidence on scientific knowledge 
Examination of past research on scientific knowledge indicates that any attempt to conceive 
of this as a coherent form of understanding faces similar kinds of difficulties. In terms of 
registration of evidence (as opposed to its generation via investigative activity), the early 
emergence of causal perception has already been noted. Importantly, Schulz et al. (2007) 
also found that young children’s awareness of causal association across events corresponds 
to computer models of probabilities derived from the same information, suggesting it may be 
essentially driven by statistical sensitivity and direct registration of information about 
contingencies.  
 
Further indications of such sensitivities are reported by Howe et al. (1999), who assessed 9 
to 14 year olds’ understanding of the four topic areas they considered (object flotation, water 
pressure, shadow size and motion down an incline) in preparation for the hypothesis testing 
phase of their research. They found that participants very rarely discounted as causally 
irrelevant any factor that actually affected outcome, though they were not always correct 
about the direction of effect, believing for instance that small things float and large sink, an 
oversimplification of the effect of size (a point we return to later). Such discounting happened 
on only 16 occasions in the course of over 1300 judgements (just over 1% of trials). This 
accuracy can only be attributed to children having previously tracked observed covariation 
over time, as these disparate topics were not areas covered in science lessons and the 
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study provided no opportunity for observation or feedback before beliefs were assessed. 
diSessa (1988) reports extremely similar findings.  
 
Adult cognition in tasks analogous to the ‘blicket detector’ paradigm also indicates that their 
performance derives from estimations of relative probability. Indeed, even though adults are 
generally poor at deliberate reasoning about probability, their everyday estimations of 
outcome probabilities are sensitive to subtle distributional characteristics that are naturally 
captured by statistical models (Chater, Tenenbaum & Yuille, 2006). The evidence suggests 
then that statistically-based causal awareness emerges in infancy, and continues to operate 
into adulthood. 
 
This accuracy in tacit awareness contrasts in striking fashion with inaccurate performance on 
tasks requiring explicit judgments that ostensibly ought to be able to utilise it, although as 
noted above accurate registration of contingency is not necessarily the same as being aware 
of the full characteristics of the effect produced. For example, Howe, Tavares and Devine 
(2012) compared 6 to 10 year olds’ ability to either explicitly predict or recognise the 
trajectory likely to be followed by falling objects, half of which were in horizontal motion at the 
point of release. Prediction responses were characterised by an increasing tendency with 
age to portray a backwards trajectory – an outcome which was never correct – whereas 
backwards trajectories were selected in only 22% of recognition responses, and did not 
increase in frequency with age. Follow-up research (Howe, Taylor Tavares & Devine, 2014) 
focused solely on horizontal motion confirmed a consistent recognition-prediction gap of the 
same kind across two tasks addressing direction and speed respectively in the context of the 
motion of billiard balls. 
 
There appear to be clear signs then that early-originating sensitivity to covariation between 
factors and outcomes is separated in some fashion from explicit knowledge, suggesting the 
latter is acquired in distinct and at least partly non-observational fashion. This disjunction 
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may possibly arise because tacit perceptual and explicit linguistic knowledge are initially held 
within separate or only partially overlapping neurocognitive systems (Fugelsang & 
Mareschal, 2014; Howe et al., 2014; Tolmie, 2012), with linguistic knowledge influenced by 
conversation. The work of Harris and colleagues on ‘testimony’ (see e.g., Harris & Koenig, 
2006; Harris & Corriveau, 2014) certainly shows that young children readily attend to the 
knowledge implications of others’ statements (especially their parents); are capable from 3 
years of making sophisticated judgments about the reliability of different sources according 
to their track record and degree of consensus with others; and that these effects extend to 
learning about aspects of science.  
 
In the specific context of scientific knowledge, an analysis of variations in primary age 
children’s understanding of different types of physical phenomena by Howe (1998) found 
that better understood topics which exhibited theory-like organization corresponded with 
those which were commonly referred to in everyday conversation (e.g., heating and cooling). 
Research by Symons, Tolmie and Oaksford (2015) with 6 to 11 year olds in the context of 
motion down an incline found that although effects were more pronounced amongst older 
children, all age groups exhibited sensitivity to source reliability in being told that weight did 
not affect outcome, showing greater change in their own predictions when that information 
ostensibly came from a teacher as opposed to another child. Interestingly, a final shift to 
dismissing effects of weight only came when children subsequently tested outcomes 
themselves, suggesting that the combination of external information and personal 
observation has the greatest influence (see also Howe, 2014b). 
 
Further evidence of both the hypothesised disjunction between tacit and explicit knowledge, 
and the influence of conversation is provided by a study of 5 to 10 year olds’ understanding 
of physical state change i.e., melting, freezing, evaporation and condensation (Tolmie, 
2014). Despite the essential equivalence of the physical processes involved in each, 
children’s ability to describe and explain the different types of change differed significantly, 
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with performance best on melting and then freezing, and worst on evaporation and then 
condensation. This pattern appears to mirror again the extent to which a) children encounter 
each change type in everyday experience and b) it forms the topic of everyday conversation. 
Melting is commonly experienced and referred to, freezing is referred to but rarely directly 
witnessed, and evaporation and condensation are both harder to directly perceive (the gas-
liquid transition is less tangible) and much less commonly mentioned. Moreover, explanation 
quality was only weakly related at best to description quality for melting and freezing, 
indicating that explanation and description were the product of at least partially distinct 
processes. However, the relationship between the two was substantially stronger for 
evaporation (performance on condensation was too poor to assess this relationship).  
 
This research suggests conversation may create explicit conceptual grasp which is more 
advanced in terms of reportability, but potentially ill-grounded in observation if the source is 
perceived to be reliable but in fact is not (as may be the case for many parents, for 
example), and relevant events are either fleeting or even hidden. This would be a strong 
candidate mechanism for the origin of the naïve science concepts that in many instances 
children possess at entry to school (Driver, Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985). Bottom-up 
derivation of explanatory concepts via the description of observations appears to be more 
likely in the absence of conversational influence – possibly supported in some instances by 
more formally organised classroom encounters, as may be the case for evaporation – and 
may be more accurate. It may also be slower and have an uncertain trajectory. Whether it is 
assisted by skills of testing and manipulation is unknown.  
 
 
A proposed set of core skills 
 
The cumulative implication of these points is that despite its apparent appeal, the distinction 
between investigative and conceptual abilities has resulted in an artificial and unhelpful 
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distancing between them in past research, where systematic joint scrutiny would have been 
more informative. More crucially, we argue that this research has failed to provide a clearly 
articulated model of the skills on which performance actually turns, because it is in fact 
evident that neither investigative nor conceptual abilities are unitary in character and that the 
relationship between their different elements is complex.  
 
The state change research suggests instead that coordinated scientific understanding may 
rest ultimately on a simpler and more fundamental set of core skills, about which, for the 
most part, we know surprisingly little in terms of their basic characteristics, let alone the 
relationships between them. The differential ability of children to describe melting and 
freezing indicates that opportunity to witness instances of phenomena is important, but the 
differences between melting and evaporation imply further that actively attending to available 
instances and noting the changes that occur is equally crucial. The differential relationship 
between explanation and description for melting or freezing and evaporation indicates that 
not only is explanatory ability inherently distinct from such observation, but that it can 
emerge in various ways. Finally, though the point is more implicit, any complete integration 
of description and explanation must require systematic tracking of effects across instances 
of phenomena and assessment of their consistency with proffered accounts. We therefore 
argue that the core skills underpinning science learning are as follows: 
 
Accurate observation. Observation of covariation is a necessary first step in the 
identification of causal relations, but accurate scrutiny is the basis of unbiased observation, a 
key element of scientific procedure. Ability to explicitly describe specific observations makes 
this process fuller and more deliberate, and may also aid extension of causal perception to 
distal connections (i.e., causal effects over time) by making it possible to note and recall 
causal candidates among prior events. In terms of skill development, progress therefore 
appears likely to be along a dimension from tacit sensitivity – an ability which appears to be 
early-emerging and predominantly domain-general – to verbal encoding of relationships, 
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including identification of variables, which may be more domain-specific, initially at least. 
Despite generally good performance on measures of tacit awareness from 24 months, there 
is nevertheless clear evidence of individual variation in observational ability (Bonawitz et al., 
2010; Sobel, Tenenbaum & Gopnik, 2004) which may potentially have long-term impact. It is 
evident from the state change research that descriptive ability varies to a greater extent, both 
individually and with age and context. 
 
The ability to extract and reason about causal connections. Reasoning about causal 
connections (i.e., drawing causal inferences) relies on accurate observation, so should be 
related to it. However, it further requires the coordination of different observations (Kuhn et 
al., 2008); unbiased extraction of associations, discounting intrusive or even conflicting 
effects which arise from the noisy nature of many phenomena; recognition of gaps in 
evidence; and, ultimately, verbal summation of relationships (the description index used in 
Tolmie, 2014, distinguished between context-specific and generic responses, and found that 
the latter became more prevalent with age). It is this ability which may ultimately lead to an 
understanding of the importance of controlled tests, and to the explicit evaluation of evidence 
and scientific argument. The extent of individual variation is largely unknown, but the range 
of procedural ability found in secondary school students (see Kuhn et al.; Shayer & 
Ginsburg, 2009) suggests it is likely to be high. 
 
Application of knowledge regarding mechanisms and processes that explain inferred 
connections. Explanation has crucial potential links to the data derived from observed 
causal connections since it provides the means of specifying the processes that result in 
those observations. At higher levels of performance, this relationship is likely to underpin 
hypothesis generation and testing. However, as noted above, explanatory concepts are 
often separated from accurate observation, at least initially, and evidence suggests 
individuals exhibit wide variation in explanatory ability between and even within topic areas 
(Ape et al., 2015; Howe, 1998; Tolmie, 2014), indicating a high degree of domain-specificity. 
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Whether learners who are more advanced in one area tend nevertheless to be more 
advanced in others is largely unknown, though, because few studies with primary age 
children have encompassed a number of areas, and those that have rarely report cross-topic 
correlations. Despite its importance to school curricula, it is also unclear whether there are 
predictable processes of conceptual extension and generalisation, with progress in one topic 
building on earlier gains in another. Some have argued that knowledge is represented in 
highly organised theory-like structures, with conceptual change occurring through theory-
replacement processes – ‘knowledge as theory’ approaches (e.g., Carey 1985; Gelman, 
2009; Vosniadou 2002, 2014; Vosniadou & Ioannides, 2006), suggesting there is a strong 
basis for extension and generalisation. However, others argue that concepts are more 
typically a collection of context-specific fragments, with development being more iterative in 
character – ‘knowledge in pieces’ approaches (e.g., diSessa, 1993).  
 
Since any integrated performance demands all three of these skills, i.e. observation, 
extracting and reasoning about causal connections, and explanation, we hypothesise that it 
is in fact these – and not early proto-investigative abilities – which provide the foundation for 
fully-fledged reasoning and conceptual capacity, by establishing a sense of the relationship 
between theory and evidence. Interestingly, echoing this analysis, the National Curriculum 
for Science in England (Department for Education, 2013) now emphasises observation 
(including noting patterns and relationships), articulation of concepts and acquisition of 
scientific vocabulary, and at upper primary level, explanation and prediction, though it pays 
no attention to the coordination of these different skills, which we argue is crucial for children 
to progress. The designers provide no explicit account of why these skills matter, either, 
despite the fact that a clear rationale is far more likely to engage teachers than simple 
prescription. 
 
 
Relationships of the core skills to each other and to more general cognitive abilities 
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The opening to this paper posed the question of how any identified core skills might relate to 
each other and to more general cognitive abilities. Returning to this question now, it is clear 
that there is no current basis for assuming any specific relationship between the abilities to 
observe, extract patterns of data and explain phenomena, and the nature of these 
relationships must therefore be determined by deliberate empirical investigation. The 
widespread strategy of examining scientific reasoning in contexts which do not involve real 
phenomena means that evidence on the relationship between observation and pattern 
extraction on the one hand and scientific concepts on the other is restricted – although the 
apparent emergence of reasoning abilities around 24 months (Schulz et al., 2007) when 
explanatory abilities are rudimentary at best suggests a disjunction between them.  
 
Even where studies have looked at reasoning in real contexts, the data are inconsistent. 
Howe et al. (1999) found that late primary/early secondary participants were uniformly poor 
at conducting systematic tests of the effects of variables across four contexts, despite 
differing in their levels of understanding of these contexts, which also suggests there is no 
relationship between reasoning and explanatory abilities. Among pre-schoolers, the more 
recent multiple choice research by Ape et al. (2015) suggests if anything a negative 
relationship between understanding and reasoning. In contrast, using pictorial 
representations of a set of precursor conditions and outcomes, both covarying and non-
covarying, Koerber et al. (2005) found that conceptual understanding was associated with 
better reasoning. The methods of assessment in these latter two studies differ, however, and 
in neither case is the direction of the reported effect particularly strong.  
 
The relationship between observational and pattern extraction abilities is similarly unclear 
because we are not aware of any instance of them having been assessed separately: 
studies of reasoning uniformly concatenate them. Accurate observation does not inherently 
entail an ability to coordinate information across observations, though, and the state change 
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research (Tolmie, 2014) indicates that younger children in particular frequently fail to connect 
different instances of the same phenomenon (e.g. melting), suggesting that coordination 
does present specific challenges.  
 
With regard to that coordination – and relationships to more general cognitive abilities – the 
above account suggests that language, expressive ability in particular, must significantly 
influence science learning, since it is language that allows children to build connections 
between observations and explicit explanation. Ghazali (2014) provides initial evidence of 
this influence. Using a lagged design, she found consistently strong relationships between 
measures of both receptive (i.e., recognition of vocabulary) and expressive language 
(production of definitions) and understanding of a range of biological concepts (biodiversity, 
ecology, inheritance and evolution) among 4 to 11 year olds. She also found that these 
relationships were not attributable to language having a general impact on performance 
within the test context, since they were almost entirely mediated by construct-specific 
language ability, with biodiversity related to ecology, and ecology related in turn to evolution 
and inheritance.  
 
The implication is that external resourcing of science-related language skills via school input 
is likely to be an important contributory influence on understanding. This suggests effects of 
quality of classroom conversation in science, and also perhaps use of computer-based 
resources to support science activity, depending on their design and content. At a basic 
level, explanatory ability is likely to be influenced by exposure to explicit constructs, and 
therefore the quality of teacher or software input in terms of the use of vocabulary to convey 
science fact and to describe mechanisms and processes may be an important environmental 
variable. In line with this, Bonawitz et al. (2010) found that 24 month olds who had witnessed 
events described using causal language made attempts to manipulate causal effects; such 
manipulations were not otherwise seen until two years later. They conclude that language 
plays an important role in helping children extend causal representations. However, the 
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exact timing and nature of such input may be critical: Philips and Tolmie (2007) found that 
explicit explanations of balance scale problems by parental tutors promoted learning among 
8 year olds only when they already had some grasp of the role of weight and distance; in the 
absence of this, such explanations appeared to create confusion.  
 
The impact of language would appear at root, though, to be that it facilitates the coordination 
of different elements of conceptual grasp into a more coherent whole, and in this respect it is 
consistent with Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) account of conceptual change via the process of 
representational redescription (RR). According to this, conceptual development begins with 
the acquisition of fragmentary implicit representations of action-event relationships which are 
triggered when appropriate circumstances are encountered, but are not otherwise mentally 
manipulable. These become increasingly coordinated as the connections between them are 
made more explicit, initially via a heightened internal awareness, but eventually via encoding 
in language.  
 
Crucially, in this account, at the initial stage of internal connection, much of the detail 
contained in implicit representations is lost and the resulting structures become ideas which 
are detached from data; but as the process of explication proceeds further, there is renewed 
attention to data and mapping this as part of more coordinated language-based structures. 
In other words, then, the process of explication of concepts via language could quite 
reasonably provide the basis of more systematic theory-building and scientific thinking, the 
sought-for bridge between early awareness of covariation and later reasoning skills. Before 
this happens, though, representations and observations are indeed separated, and might 
logically be more so if the former are externally resourced. Note too that within this account 
conceptual grasp and procedural knowledge tend to go hand in hand, albeit in complex 
fashion (cf. Schauble et al., 1991), and both must therefore be topic-specific, at least initially 
– as the evidence considered earlier suggests. 
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The emerging picture is a complex one, then, but basically:  
a) children and adults alike have accurate low level systems which cumulatively extract 
perceptual regularities, possibly to serve anticipatory mechanisms;  
b) some (but not all) aspects of experience get made more explicit via markers including 
language (cf. levels E1 to E3 in the RR model), and become coordinated into actual 
concepts;  
c) where this happens in bottom-up fashion, the result is slowly emerging, relatively accurate 
partially formulated explicit ideas (e.g., the effect of slope angle on motion), though these 
may sometimes be simplifications of the real state of affairs (e.g., beliefs about the effect of 
size on object flotation, when size is only relevant in combination with mass);  
d) where this process has top-down feeds from everyday conversation and accompanying 
experiences (perhaps including media footage), it may capture phenomena inaccurately and 
so lead to distorted perceptions of observable data and self-reinforcing misconceptions, 
which eventually become automated e.g., the belief in the backwards trajectories of falling 
objects (cf. Howe, McWilliam and Cross, 2005, who found that collaborative group work 
produces heightened sensitivity to the relationships that have been discussed when these 
are encountered in subsequent experience).  
 
In this account, language is the driver for explicit concepts, and its effects are ubiquitous. 
However, it operates in variable fashion, produces different configurations of relationship 
between tacit and explicit understanding (cf. Howe et al., 2014), and is far from uniformly 
helpful. It needs to be systematically introduced alongside careful observation to be sure of 
being productive, which is where education comes in. Note that this position is more 
consistent with ‘knowledge in pieces’ (cf. diSessa, 1988, 1993) than ‘knowledge as theory’ 
approaches (cf. Gelman, 2009) to conceptual organisation. It also suggests an interesting 
potential interim point in development at which gesture might in some contexts capture direct 
readout from perceptual experience that may be in tension with explicit language (see Pine, 
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Lufkin & Messer, 2004, who found evidence of exactly this tension in a balance task, and 
also that children who exhibited it showed greater learning gains). 
 
In addition to language, the ability to integrate different observations about the effect of a 
factor and link patterns of outcome to potential explanations seems likely to rest also on the 
ability to manipulate data (executive function), and on temporary storage capacity (visual 
and verbal working memory). There is evidence that this is the case with adults. Fugelsang 
and Dunbar (2005), for instance, found that processing of evidence which was inconsistent 
with a theory that was being assessed led to activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), which is associated with executive function – though consistent evidence was not 
apparently attended to in the same way, suggesting a tendency to simply accept this. 
Nayfield, Fuccillo and Greenfield (2013) found that executive function is predictive of school 
readiness scores in science among 4 to 5 year olds. Other research with adults suggests 
semantic inhibitory control – the ability to suppress irrelevant associations – is key to 
supplanting misconceptions (Masson, Potvin, Riopel & Brault Foisy, 2014). It may therefore 
also influence the coordination of observed evidence and explanation by facilitating the 
separation of relevant from irrelevant information and the recognition of inconsistencies.  
 
In general, empirical support for an influence of executive function and working memory on 
science learning is somewhat patchy. Rhodes, Booth, Campbell, Blythe, Delibegovic and 
Wheate (2012) and Gathercole, Pickering, Knight and Stegman (2004) report relationships 
between working memory and science achievement measures, but in both cases this was 
among secondary school students, and corresponding data were not available for primary 
age participants. Brookman (2015), again working with adolescents, found more specifically 
that inhibitory control measures were predictive of performance on a science and maths 
misconceptions task, in line with the hypothesis that suppression of incorrect ideas is 
required so that correct scientific or mathematical responses can be chosen. In contrast, the 
state change research with primary age children referred to above (Tolmie, 2014) included 
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measures of executive function, semantic inhibitory control and both verbal and visual 
working memory, and found little sign of general effects of any of these. Semantic inhibitory 
control was related to quality of descriptions for melting and freezing, however, consistent 
with the notion that received explanatory frames had to be suppressed for good descriptions 
of these to be produced.  
 
The implication may be that executive function and working memory become more influential 
with age, which would be consistent with the relatively late maturation of the former (Zelazo, 
Carlson & Kesek, 2008). However, it may also be that we need more refined hypotheses of 
how executive function and working memory affect science learning, especially amongst 
primary age children. In particular, it may be unreasonable to expect their influence to 
manifest in relation to cumulative measures of understanding when their operation is much 
more likely to impact on the specific instances of processing from which cumulative 
understanding emerges over time. In other words, we should look for their influence on more 
moment-to-moment decisions, as in Brookman’s (2015) task. 
 
These are not the only broader functions that might be relevant. As already noted, sensitivity 
to observational data shows individual variation which might be attributable to differences in 
attentional control (cf. Bonawitz et al., 2010, on an apparent relationship between failure to 
look at the outcomes of actions and failure to engage in spontaneous manipulations). The 
balance between global and local processing (i.e., a focus on either broad patterns of 
information or detailed elements within this) may also be relevant to observational skill, and 
spatial ability may facilitate the building of representations that capture dynamic causal 
processes (cf. Piaget, 1972; Sanchez & Wiley, 2014). As with executive function and 
working memory, however, we need specific hypotheses about how these might impact on 
performance and learning before their potential influence can be properly assessed. 
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Some conclusions 
 
At present there is no consensus on the nature of the skills involved in science learning, and 
little in depth analysis of their possible general cognitive precursors among school age 
children. There is a notable lack of research examining relationships between investigative 
skills at any level and grasp of scientific concepts, and almost no work looking at the extent 
to which conceptual grasp in one topic area predicts that in another. We need especially to 
establish how far skills are related between physics and biology topics, given the distinctions 
drawn between these domains (Carey, 1985), differences in the complexity of the physical 
systems involved, the proximal vs distal nature of effects, and contrasting manipulability of 
phenomena.  
 
There is a clear need then for a systematic and broadly oriented programme of research on 
the key influences on science learning and the cognitive processes that these imply. The 
desire to understand these abilities, the processes they draw on and their relationship both 
to each other and to broader cognitive functions at different ages is more than academic. 
Their precise nature carries important implications for the design of effective pedagogical 
strategies in terms of what is promoted when, and how. In particular, we need to establish 
whether the developmental pattern is a shift from fragmented ability across different skills – 
and different topics – to gradual integration, or whether development in a specific skill area 
exerts an influence on growth in others. Uncovering this pattern has crucial implications: 
gradual integration would imply learning will be best promoted by developing each skill, 
possibly in a range of topic areas, and then building connections between them; a lead skill 
pattern would imply instead that effort should be focused on promoting that skill, at least 
initially. How far these skills and the relationships between them are facilitated or 
constrained by language and executive function is a further key consideration, because this 
too will impact on effective sequencing and timing. These are exactly the kinds of point on 
24 
which the National Curriculum for Science in England (Department for Education, 2013) is 
silent. 
 
We believe that the core skills framework set out in this paper provides a clearer model for 
making progress than the procedural-conceptual dichotomy that has dominated most 
cognitively oriented research on science learning to date. One signal of its potential utility is 
its capacity to explain the established success of collaborative group work activities in 
science, in which learners engage in joint prediction, testing and interpretation of the effects 
of manipulating variables. Group work of this kind has been found to promote improved 
attention to disconfirming evidence and the development of more accurate concepts, 
especially where participants have differing initial conceptions (Howe, Tolmie, Duchak-
Tanner & Rattray, 2000; Howe, Tolmie & Rodgers, 1992; Tolmie, Howe, Mackenzie & Greer, 
1993). These outcomes have been found to apply not just under ‘laboratory’ conditions, but 
in standard classroom settings (Howe, Tolmie, Thurston, Topping, Christie, Livingston, 
Jessiman & Donaldson, 2007).  
 
One plausible interpretation of these results is that collaborative work brings observations, 
extraction of patterns of data and explanatory language together under circumstances where 
there is both a constraint on bias and pressure to articulate ideas in relation to data because 
of the group context. The process of predicting, testing and explaining the effects of the 
manipulation of variables may create an informational load that primary age children find 
difficult to manage – hence their poor individual performance on hypothesis testing activities. 
However, the presence of others may serve to facilitate its management by effectively 
distributing it between group members, with each attending to different elements because of 
their differing initial ideas, and the shared nature of the task creating an incentive to pool 
these. In terms of the framework presented here, then, collaborative group work is 
successful because it creates exactly the conditions under which all three core skills need to 
be coordinated, whilst inherently providing support for the demands of doing so. 
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Even if this model is not correct, however, we still need to collect data across the primary 
school age range on these dimensions or something like them in order to establish 1) which 
skills are in fact core to scientific understanding, 2) how these relate to each other and to 
more general cognitive abilities, 3) how these skills and these relationships change with age, 
and 4) whether they vary with topic. These data might also allow us to examine why some 
children seem to have particular difficulties with science learning, and whether there may in 
fact be as yet unidentified deficits corresponding to dyslexia and dyscalculia in literacy and 
mathematics.  
 
In the absence of a clear analysis of this kind, there is no certain basis for determining the 
pedagogical strategies that are likely to be effective or how the science curriculum might be 
sequentially organised to promote ordered growth in understanding – despite the clear 
message from work on reading and number that effective teaching rests on exactly this kind 
of detailed area-specific analysis. The skill set identified by the National Curriculum for 
Science in England represents a step in the right direction, but we currently have no real 
knowledge about how these pieces join together. The need to address this lack of 
understanding is urgent. 
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